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This paper analyzes the effects of geographical proximity and agglomeration of FDIs 
(foreign direct investments) on domestic firms in the privatized glass sector in the 
Czech Republic. The motivation for this research is based on the scant evidence in 
Central and Eastern Europe of the effects of geographical proximity and 
agglomeration on the productivity of domestic firms. This study aims to explain 
how spillovers are transferred from FDIs  to domestic firms.   
The econometrical analysis, using original panel data from 1990 to 2006, provides 
evidence that the agglomeration of FDIs has a negative and significant effect on the 
productivity of domestic firms in the glass sector at a 5% level. The effect of 
geographical proximity to FDIs is significant at a 10% level but not in all models. 
The results support the importance of geographic proximity and agglomeration of 
FDIs and conform with the evidence that shows that FDIs have produced negative 
spillovers on domestic firms in transition countries.  
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Extensive evidence about spillovers in transition countries shows insignificant or 
negative generalized spillovers from FDIs. FDIs have not had positive spillovers as 
expected. The motivation for this study is based on the results about spillovers that 
contrast the expectations and on the scant evidence in Central and Eastern Europe of 
the  effects of  geographical proximity and agglomeration on the productivity of 
domestic firms. The aim is to explain how the location of FDIs have affected the 
productivity of domestic firms, creating negative spillovers to privatized firms. 
This paper examines the effects of geographical proximity and agglomeration of FDIs 
on domestic firms using a population of privatized firms in the glass sector i n the 
Czech Republic. It is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the privatization 
process in the glass sector in the Czech Republic. Section 2 summarizes the related 
theoretical and empirical literature and describes its various contributions and 
shortcomings. Section 3 describes the data, the methodology and discusses the 
variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical results and 




1. The privatization of the glass sector in the Czech Republic 
 
The privatization of the glass sector was carried out under three different schemes: 
restitution, small-scale privatization and large-scale privatization.  The first two 
schemes were started in 1990 and were the most prominent in the early years of the 
transition. Large-scale privatization, by which the largest firms were privatized, began 
in 1991 and was completed by 1995 (Hanousek et al. 2007).  
Smaller glassworks were typically  privatized with the restitution programme, and  
were auctioned off or sold in tenders. However, most of the previous owners of the 
glassworks had to pay for taking back their family businesses because the state had 
made some investments in the glasswork during the years of nationalization. This 
information was confirmed from personal interviews with  Mr.  Vlastimil  Beránek,  
owner of the glasswork “Berá nek, spol. s r. o.” (on 3
th September 2004),  and Mr. Jiří  
R ü ckl, owner of the glasswork “Rückl Crystal a.s.” (on 10
th September 2004). 
In rare cases, the privatization of ownership of the glasswork was given to the  
management, as was the case of the Moser company. 
The largest glassworks were privatized with a voucher program, as Vertex a.s. (today 
Saint-Gobain Vertex a.s.) or sold directly to domestic and foreign investors as in,   2 
respectively, Crystalex a.s. and Glavunion a.s. (today AGC Flat Glass Czech a.s.) (for 
an extensive analysis of the AGC Flat Glass Czech case, see Galeotti and Nollen 
2008). 
The literature about the privatization and the effects of acquisitions from FDIs in the 
Czech Republic is extensive. However, there are no specific studies, according to my  
research, about the spillover effects of FDIs on the domestic firms that focus on 
privatized firms in an industrial sector. 
 
 
2. Theoretical and empirical background 
2.1 Evidence about horizontal spillovers in the transition countries 
 
The existence of spillovers from FDI is a natural extension of the  Ownership, 
Location and Internalization (OLI) theory, according to which foreign investors are 
motivated to enter foreign markets if they have some firm-specific advantages that 
enable them to outperform local firms. At the same time they possess some intangible 
asset, such as technology and know-how, that constitutes a potentially important gain 
for the host country (Dunning 1981).  
The research about  spillovers from FDI has generated a large strand of empirical 
studies in the transition countries and the results are opposed to the expectations. The 
evidence has found  insignificant  or negative  generalized spillovers from 
multinationals located in the same industry (horizontal spillovers) (UNECE 2001). 
The studies on the Czech Republic have also found mixed or negative spillovers from 
FDIs (Djankov and Hoekman 2000, Kinoshita 2000, Damijan et al. 2003a 2003b, 
Kosová 2006, Stančí k 2007, Geršl et al. 2007). Recent studies about spillovers have 
concerned several transition countries and used large statistical databases 
(Gorodnichenko et al. 2007), but the evidence about horizontal spillovers remains 
weak or mixed. Gorodnichenko et al. (2007), analyzing spillovers in 17 emerging 
countries, have found mostly insignificant horizontal spillovers, except for older firms 
and firms in the service sector which have positive ones.  
Görg and Greenaway (2001 2004) give three potential reasons for empirically failing 
to find significant spillovers. First, multinational corporations (MNCs) might be very 
effective in protecting their technology advantages and preventing, in this way, 
potential spillovers. Second, spillovers may exist and make up  some part of the 
residual that appears in all growth equations, but current statistical methods and 
datasets are unable to identify them. Third, most of the studies have been carried out 
at the aggregate level and using cross-sectional studies: there  may be much 
heterogeneity of spillovers and aggregate studies may therefore fail to detect them. 
Moreover, the poor quality of data, limited samples of firms studied and short panels 
of firms may be other reasons for failing to find evidence of spillovers (Damijan et al. 
2003b).  Torlak (2004) points out two further drawbacks of empirical studies. First, 
the problem of causality, because MNCs may locate in high productive industries and 
do not improve with their spillovers the industry productivity as usually it is believed. 
Second, the negative demand effect from FDIs may force less productive domestic 
firms to exit the market while the MNCs increase their market shares which finally 
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2.2 Spillover channels and the importance of geographic proximity 
 
According to Marshall (1920) three sources of positive externalities can be identified. 
Locating near each other provides firms access to specialized input, suppliers and 
customers, a local market for skilled labour, and technological spillovers through 
information exchange. The local pool of skilled labour provides a gain for both 
workers and individual production units by maximising the job-matching 
opportunities and thus reducing the search costs (Gordon and McCann 2000, 
Krugman 1991). A localised industry can support more suppliers, which increases the 
level of specialisation and efficiency of the supply base (Harrison 1992). 
The Marshall-Arrow-Romer externalities (defined in this way from Glaeser, Kallal, 
Scheinkman and Shleifer 1992) are knowledge spillovers external to a  firm but 
internal to an industry and within a geographic region. Because human capital 
acquisition and imitation are considered important channels for knowledge spillovers, 
domestic firms located near multinationals may be more likely to benefit than other 
firms. As the theory from the economic geographic literature predicts, when 
knowledge is more tacit in nature, face to face interaction and communication are 
important and geographic proximity may help transmit knowledge more effectively 
(Von Hipple 1994). While it may be possible to learn certain skills by imitation, it 
may be extremely costly to imitate without close observation. Many communication 
processes involve an exchange of information and geographical proximity that may 
allow the exchange partners to observe each other’s behaviour to avoid moral hazard 
problems. Proximity may facilitate the creation of social networks and lead to 
informal information-sharing. Personal relations and face-to-face communication 
between the employees and managers of firms located close to each other may lead to 
a higher level of knowledge transfer between them (Halpern and Muraközy 2007). 
Moreover, low mobility of labour can be a strong obstacle for technology spillovers 
when domestic firms are located far from FDIs. It is commonly argued that European 
labour markets are very rigid compared to the  US labour market  and people are less 
mobile in a geographical sense. 
Another spillover channel is competition. Greater competitive pressure faced by local 
firms may induce them to introduce new technology, to work harder, improving their 
productivity and production to defend their market share, but may also worsen their 
situation and push them out from the market. This crowding out effect may dominate 
in the beginning, but may be reversed in the long run due to the long term positive 
effects of foreign firms on domestic entrepreneurship as a result of learning, 
demonstration, networking and linkage effects between foreign and domestic firms 
(De Backer and Sleuwaegen 2002, Barrios et al. 2005), even if the positive effects 
may be limited to the more technologically advanced firms or firms belonging to the 
R&D intensive sector (Sembenelli and Siotis 2005, Hale and Longe 2006). 
Numerous econometric studies have focused on the geographic dimension of 
horizontal spillovers. Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) show the significance 
of face-to-face contacts in the process of technological learning, while Audretsch and 
Feldman (1996) provide evidence that spillovers are geographically bounded and that 
the cost of transmitting knowledge rises with spatial distance. Adams and Jaffe (1996) 
and Adams (2002) show that knowledge spillovers are stronger within a given 
distance. Driffield (2000) examines the role of productivity spillovers from inward 
investment in the UK using sector-level data and finds positive productivity spillovers 
from FDI in the same sector and region. Siöholm (1999), using detailed micro-data 
from the Indonesian manufacturing sector, examines the effect on productivity from   4 
FDI. He shows that domestic firms benefit from FDIs, but the effect differs between 
groups of industries and spillovers from FDIs are found in sectors with a high degree 
of competition. However, he does not find evidence of spillovers at the regional level. 
Some studies have found positive spatial spillovers of FDIs (Bernstein and Mohnen 
1998, Branstetter 2001) and positive productivity spillovers at the regional level 
(Griffith et al. 2002), but others have found no or negative spillovers taking into 
account the regional component (Aitken and Harrison 1999, Zucker and Darby 1998, 
Ke and Luger 1996). Girma and Wakelin (2002)  find evidence for positive spillovers 
from FDIs in the same region and sector in the United Kingdom, but the results are 
significant only for firms that have a low technology gap compared to multinationals. 
There is only one study, according to my knowledge, about the effects of geographic 
proximity with FDI on domestic firms in transition countries. Halpern and Muraközy 
(2007) analyze spillovers in Hungary: first, they find no evidence of horizontal 
spillovers, but when they take distance into consideration, they find positive 
horizontal spillovers for domestic firms close to foreign-owned firms. The distance 
between foreign and domestic firms matters and plays an important role in 
determining the magnitude of the spillover effect: horizontal spillovers decrease with 
distance. They conclude that spillovers via labour mobility may play an important role 
over small distances, while competition is the dominant channel over long distances 
(Halpern and Muraközy 2007 p. 801).  
Domestic firms that are located along the national borders might benefit from 
spillovers from foreign investors located in neighbour countries.  Cieślik (2005) 
analyzes the effect of border effects for the location of foreign firms in Poland using a 
regional data set from the 1990s. His study finds that regions located along the Polish 
segment of the Eastern frontier of the enlarged European Union are less attractive to 
foreign investors compared to other Polish regions. I have not found empirical studies 
that take into account the effect of distance from the national border and the closest 
country on the productivity of domestic firms. 
 
On the basis of the existing theory and empirical research, as discussed above, I 
propose the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The distance from FDI is positively associated with domestic firm’s 
performance 
 
Hypothesis 2: The density of FDI in the region is positively associated with domestic 
firm’s performance 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
I have chosen a population of privatized firms in one industrial sector because in this 
way I can control for some relevant differences between privatized and new firms and 
it is possible to reduce firm’s heterogeneity and variance.    
The data used in this analysis come from different sources: the companies’ annual 
reports available for the public in the business register, the Magnus Database, the 
Aspekt Reports, and the National Property Fund of the Czech Republic. This analysis 
is focused on firms in the Czech Republic in  sector 26100, according to the Industrial 
Classification of Economic Activities (CZ-NACE code),  i.e. firms  engaged in the 
manufacturing of glass and glass products. The panel includes only firms that existed 
before 1989 and for which financial data are available,  which allows  for  an   5 
unbalanced panel of 42 firms with data from 1990 to 2006. The decision to focus on 
firms existing in the central planning is done in order to analyze the effects of FDIs on 
privatized firms. Moreover, since these firms were connected during central planning, 
it is plausible that the spillover effects of FDIs will be stronger; foreign investors will 
have stronger effects on their neighbour domestic firms because of their common past 
and experiences. New firms in the glass sector have not experienced the privatization 
process and might not experience such strong effects. I have chosen the glass sector 
because this sector has a long tradition in the Czech Republic and for this reason FDIs 
entered during the privatization process and did not enter with greenfield investments 
as in other industrial sectors.  
Some glassworks have more processing plants. For my analysis, I have taken into 
account the location of headquarters and not of the processing plants. The reasons for 
this choice are the following. First, most of the financial data available pertain to the 
whole company concern and are n ot available for the single productive plants. 
Second, even if spillovers might spill from the productive plant to the neighbourhood 
area, usually information about the production, products and technology move from 
the production plants to the headquarters through the management and 
communications between the firm’s departments.  Finally, u sually the production 
plants are located close to the headquarters and when a company has several plants, it 
is difficult to choose one of them for the location of spillovers.    
 
In the international technology diffusion literature (see Keller 2002), the effect of 
geographical proximity is measured by physical distance (a continuous variable) 
between countries. On the contrary, the FDI literature studies the impact of 
multinationals on the productivity of domestic firms within regions of a country by 
using discrete measures of FDIs (for example dichotomizing the total amount of FDI 
in the region and outside the region). 
In this paper I measure geographical proximity using the distance in kilometers of 
each firm from the closest FDI and the density of FDIs at regional level using the 
employment of foreign firms in the region. 
 
It is necessary to specify that I do not measure spillovers directly, as many empirical 
studies have tried to do it with different proxies, using - for example - the relationship 
between the level of foreign involvement in an industry (measured by the share of 
labor force in the industry employed by foreign firms or by the extent of foreign 
ownership) and the total factor productivity growth in the sector. Because of the 
difficulties in measuring spillovers and the various mechanisms which underlie them, 
an analysis of the processes how spillovers occur is more relevant.   
 
To eliminate the effect of inflation, I adjust variables measured in Czech crowns to 
inflation using price indices of the glass sector (sector 26100) provided by the Czech 
Statistical Office. 
 
3.1 The Dependent Variable 
Performance 
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3.2 Explanatory variables 
I use the following variables: the distance in kilometers from the closest FDI, the 
natural logarithm of the number of employees in foreign firms in the region. As 
control variables I include firm’s characteristics as firm size, the number of years 
from privatization, the percentage of machine-made production and capital intensity. 
Moreover, I include variables that measure the competition effect, as the Lerner index 
and the density of domestic firms at regional level, measured by the natural logarithm 
of the number of employees of domestic firms in the region.  I also consider, in 
different models, the minimum distance from the national border and the closest 
neighboring country.  
 
3.2.1 Geographical  proximity and agglomeration of FDIs 
 
Distance from FDI 
I measure the distance in kilometers from the closest FDI in the glass sector. The 
distance is measured using road-distance data (from the web-site www.mapy.cz). No 
distinction is made for this variable between firms that produce hand-made or 
automatic glass, since spillovers from FDIs to domestic firms might happen in the 
technological process of glass production, but also in the management of the company 
and in other economical aspects that affect the firms’ productivity. However, for a 
sensitivity analysis, this distinction will be taken into account in separate regression 
models. 
I expect this variable to have a negative sign if FDIs have positive spillovers on the 
productivity of domestic firms.  
 
Density of foreign firms in the region 
I measure the agglomeration of FDI in a region with the natural logarithm of the 
number of employees working in foreign firms in the glass sector in a region.  
I expect this variable to have a positive sign if FDIs have positive spillovers on the 
productivity of domestic firms in the region. 
 
Distance from the border and closest country 
I measure the distance in kilometers from the closest border among all the possible 
borders of Czech Republic (a list of borders is available at 
http:www.steane.com/egtre/borders/xings.php?country=CZ).. The distance is 
measured using road-distance data (from the web-site www.mapy.cz). Four dummies 
are created for each neighbor country (Germany, Austria, Poland, Slovak Republic) 
and indicate the foreign country to which a domestic firm is closest, using the 
minimum distance calculated as shown above. 
 
3.2.2 Firm’s characteristics 
Firm size 
I use the natural logarithm of the number of employees as firm size. Existing studies 
present opposing results about the effect of firm size on firm performance. Larger 
firms might be more profitable than small firms because of the advantages associated 
with economies of scale and scope (Kang and Stulz 1997) and outperform them in 
terms of technology and competitiveness, as the studies from Wagner (1993) and 
Nguyen Van, Laisney and Kaiser (2004) suggest. On the other hand, small firms 
might have an advantage over large enterprises because they are more flexible and 
they can adapt quicker to a changing economic environment (Nguyen Van, Laisney   7 
and Kaiser 2004). However, according to  Desai  et al. (2003) markets with better 
economic institutions and lower levels of capital rationing are characterized by a 
higher number of small firms that can enter and survive in the market and average 
firm size is expected to be smaller. This last hypothesis is partly supported from the 
evidence. American firms enter, on average, at a smaller scale and with lower 
productivity, many firms exit shortly after entering while the firms who survived 
quickly converge to the industry average size and productivity level; in Africa, on the 
contrary, the largest and most productive firms have the highest growth rate and are 
more likely to survive (Van Biesebroeck 2005). Other studies in less developed 
countries show a negative relation between firm size and growth rate, such as in the 
studies of Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002) and Mead and Liedholm (1998). 
I expect a positive effect of firm’s size on the performance of domestic firms because 
the advantages associated with economies of scale and the scope in the glass sector 
appear to be especially relevant in an sector that is characterized, internationally, by 
the existence of an oligopolistic market. 
 
Age 
I use the number of years from the foundation of the firm. The literature shows that, 
because of learning-by-doing effects, older firms might grow faster than younger 
firms. However, this positive effect might be counteracted by  “organizational 
geriatrics” (Agarwal and Gort 1996), which derives from the obsolescence and 
depreciation of firm’s initial human capital and physical capital. Because of these 
conflicting effects, the literature on the impact of age on firm’s performance is 
inconclusive and the results depend on data and on the estimation method used 
(Sutton 1997). In a  transition country, older firms might be disadvantaged compared 
to younger firms, because they had to overcome the transition process, which implies 
learning new habits and new ways of doing business. On the other hand, the glass 
sector has a long tradition and the Czech Republic has been historically prominent in 
the glass manufacturing, so that the expected sign of the coefficient of firm’s age is 
not clear.   
 
Privatization 
I measure the impact of privatization with the number of years from the privatization 
(for state-owned enterprises this variable, with a negative sign, indicates the number 
of years before the privatization). 
Most surveys of the earlier empirical studies about privatization have suggested that a 
change from state to private ownership tends to improve economic performance 
(Djankov and Murrell 2000 2002, Megginson and Netter 2001).  However, Hanousek 
et al. (2007) show that the earlier studies suffer from  serious data problems and 
inadequate treatment of endogenity of ownership. They use a panel data on a majority 
of the medium and large firms that went through mass privatization in the Czech 
Republic. They found that the performance effects of privatization in the Czech 
Republic are on the whole limited and that many types of private owners do not have 
a performance that is different from that of firms with state ownership (Hanousek et 
al. 2007). The only exceptions are concentrated foreign and domestic owners.       
I might expect a positive effect of the time passed from the privatization on the 
performance of domestic firms. However, since I have a long panel data with data 
until 2006, I expect my results to align with that from Hanousek et al. (2007) in 
concerning the effect of privatization on the performance of domestic firms.  
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Capital intensity and type of production 
In the glass sector there exist different subsectors that differentiate firms. Glassworks 
manufacture different products with various techniques. The main difference between 
glassworks firms  is  automatic  versus  hand-made production.  I include a control 
variable that indicates the percentage of automatic or machine-made production. As 
an alternative specification, I use a variable that indicates the capital intensity, 
measured as the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets in different regressions.  
I expect a positive sign for the coefficient of both these variables on the performance 
of domestic firms. 
 
Competition 
This is another control variable that captures differences in the competition and in the 
market-power between firms in different subsectors. 
As a measure of competition or market power, I have computed the Lerner index for a 
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The ratio ranges from 0 to 1. Firms that are in perfect competition show ratios close to 
zero, firms that are perfect monopolists show ratio close to 1. 
As an alternative specification of competition, I use a variable that indicates  the 
density of domestic firms in the region, measured with the natural logarithm of the 
number of employees of domestic firms in the region. 
The effect of competition can be twofold: greater competitive pressure faced by local 
firms may induce them to introduce new technology, to work harder, to improve their 
market share, but may also push them out from the market. However, this crowding 
out effect may be reversed in the long run (De Backer and Sleuwaegen 2002, Barrios 
et al. 2005), at least for the more technologically advanced firms or firms belonging to 
the R&D intensive sector (Sembenelli and Siotis 2005, Hale and Longe 2006).  
The competition derives also from the agglomeration in an industrial sector a t the 
regional level. In order to separate the effects of the density of FDI, I measure with a 
separate variable the density of domestic firms. Agglomeration in industrial clusters 
or at regional level has positive as well as negative effects; the positive expected 
effects are potential knowledge spillovers, since proximity magnifies the opportunities 
of learning, and stimulates innovation by competition on human capital. Negative 
effects are, for example, the limitation of product innovation that needs new ideas and 
differentiation (Callois 2008). 
The cited literature suggests an expected positive sign for the coefficient of the Lerner 
index variable. I expect that domestic firms that have a higher monopoly position 
have a higher productivity than the others. The sign of the density of domestic firms 
present in the region can have both signs, depending on the type of dominant effect 
and on the behaviour of domestic firms. Domestic firms in the region might have a 
collusion behaviour among them  which would increase their performance at the 
expenditures of consumers. Or a knowledge effect might prevail. In these cases this 
variable will have a positive sign. However, an excess of domestic density, 
congestion, might brings to a stealing effect and therefore a negative effect on 
productivity will be expected. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Source: author’s calculation based on companies annual reports 
 
The Table 1 shows that there is high variability among the productivity of Czech firms in the 
glass sector. The dataset includes glassworks that have a long history in the Czech Republic, 
some of them were privatized early, while others not. The average domestic glasswork has a 
machine-made production of 48% and a capital intensity of 0.448, and the variability in the 
percentage of automatic production and in the capital intensity of the sample is also high. 
The Lerner index  ranges  theoretically  from 0 to 1. However, this ratio might be also 
negative, if some firms have higher costs than revenues from sales, as it is the case for some 
domestic glassworks. 
 
The estimation model 
 
The Hausman test suggests that the fixed effect model is the more appropriate for the 
theoretical model and the panel data at a 5% significance level, and the results of the 
specification tests support the fixed effect model in all models.  
However, some variables cannot be included in the fixed effect model because they 
do not vary over time:  the variable that measures the distance in km from the closest 
national border and the four dummies for the closest neighbour country. Because of 
the characteristic of these variables, it is not possible to run a fixed effect model and a 
   N  Mean  Std. dev.  Min.  Max. 
Productivity (in Th. CZK)  372  890.578  924.663  2.693  5227.533 
Distance in Km from the closest 
FDI 
315  104.782  34.244  0  176 
Logarithm of the number of 
employees of FDI in the region  
348  0.821  2.224  0    8.388 
Firm size: Logarithm of the 
number of employees  
374  5.898  1.256  1.386  8.689 
Age  358  139.025  106.200  31  590 
Years from the privatization   439  6.694  4.594  -8  16 
Capital intensity  385  0.448  0.182  -0.085  1.775 
Machine-made production 
(percent) 
438  48.013  44.747  0  100 
Market power (Lerner index )  288  0.081  0.663  -10.47  0.83 
Logarithm of the number of 
employees of domestic firms in 
the region 
327  8.099  1.339  3.912  9.164 
Distance in km from the closest 
national border 
344  47.884  40.577  0.3  150.4 
Dummy for the closest border to 
Germany 
344  0.508  0.500  0  1 
Dummy for the closest border to 
Austria 
344  0.290  0.454  0  1 
Dummy for the closest border to 
Poland  
344  0.032  0.176  0  1 
Dummy for the closest border to 
Slovak Republic 
344  0.168  0.375  0  1   10 
specification test. Therefore, these variables will be included in a random effect model 
to test their effect and results will be presented later. 
Excluding the variables that concern the border effect, t he fixed effect model is 
preferred because the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the random effect 
model is more efficient than the fixed effect model that is less efficient but consistent. 
The fixed effect model uses the time variation in the dependent variable and in the 
independent variables “within” each cross-sectional observation (Wooldridge 2002), 
allowing to analyze the effect of geographical proximity and agglomeration of FDIs 
on each domestic firm over time. 
In order to choose between the pooled OLS model and the fixed effect model, Baltagi 
(2005 p. 13) advices to run a F-test, which is a Chow test with the restricted residual 
sums of squares (RRSS) being that of OLS on the pooled model and the unrestricted 
residual sums of squares (URSS) being that of the LSDV (Least Square Dummy 
Variable) regression.  
The results of the F-test indicate that the firms´ dummies are jointly significant and 
that OLS estimates which omit these firms dummies suffer from an omission 
variables problem rendering them biased and inconsistent. 
Among the necessary assumptions of the model, multi-collinearity must be checked. 
Although multi-collinearity does not bias the coefficients, it does make them more 
unstable and it is hard to get good estimates of their distinct effects on some 
dependent variables. Moreover, with multi-collinearity standard errors may get large, 
and variables that appear to have no significant effects individually may actually have 
quite strong significant effects as a group (Wooldridge 2003). I have checked for 
multi-collinearity effects using a Pearson correlation matrix. 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix for variables used in the analysis 
 
Source: author’s calculation based on companies annual reports 
 
A variable that is highly correlated with some independent variables is the logarithm 
of the number of employees of domestic firms in the region. The logarithm of the 
number of employees of domestic firms in the region is highly correlated with the 
distance in kilometres from the closest FDI  (0.460) and especially with the logarithm 
of the number  of employees of FDI in the region (-0.687). These high correlation 
coefficients depend on the fact that the geographical distribution of Czech and foreign 
investors depends on the outcomes of the privatization process and on some common 
determinants.  Therefore, I do not use this variable in all the models, and I will check 
if adding this variable will strongly change the results, as I expect. 
 
4. Empirical results 
I explore the impact of geographical proximity and agglomeration of FDIs on the 
productivity of domestic firms in the privatized glass sector in the Czech Republic. 
I have estimated eight different models of fixed effect regressions using various 
specifications for some variables and adding, in some models, time dummies. These 
different models allow to check the stability of the coefficients and to see if, 
  Variables  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15 
1  Productivity (in Th. 
CZK) 
1.000                             
2  Distance in Km 
from the closest 
FDI  
0.064  1.000                           
3  Logarithm  
of the number  of 
employees of FDI 
in the region 
0.402  -0.333  1.000                         
4  Logarithm  
of the number of 
employees  
0.135  -0.038  -0.142  1.000                       
5  Age  -0.161  -0.146  0.062  0.307  1.000                     
6  Years from the 
privatization  
0.307  -0.317  0.135  -0.276  -0.136  1.000                   
7  Capital intensity  0.229  0.033  0.076  0.001  -0.154  0.022  1.000                 
8  Machine-made 
production 
(percent) 
0.514  -0.268  0.365  0.175  -0.092  0.218  0.040  1.000               
9  Market power 
(Lerner index ) 
0.069  0.066  0.027  0.233  -0.027  -0.031  -0.125  0.080  1.000             
10  Logarithm  
of the number of 
employees of 
domestic firms in 
the region 
-0.173  0.460  -0.687  0.142  0.048  -0.354  -0.130  -0.202  0.036  1.000           
11  Distance in km 
from the closest 
national border 
0.108  -0.107  0.076  0.187  -0.187  0.232  0.302  0.063  0.069  -0.338  1.000         
12  Dummy for the 
closest border to 
Germany 
0.153  -0.634  0.429  0.078  0.279  0.155  0.068  0.266  0.472  -0.349  -0.023  1.000       
13  Dummy for the 
closest border to 
Austria 
-0.096  0.097  -0.151  0.177  -0.068  0.089  0.283  -0.141  0.038  0.093  0.639  -0.458  1.000     
14  Dummy for the 
closest border to 
Poland 
-0.009  0.626  -0.339  -0.216  -0.230  -0.208  -0.214  -0.168  -0.080  0.353  -0.435  -0.651  -0.458  1.000   
15  Dummy for the 
closest border to 
Slovak Republic 
-0.133  -0.398  0.181  0.006  0.018  0.000  -0.145  0.089  0.013  -0.316  -0.063  -0.116  -0.081  -0.185  1.000   12 
measuring some variables in a different way, or adding time dummies, significantly 
changes the results.  
 
Table 3: Results of fixed effect regressions  
Dependent variable: Productivity in the Czech privatized glass sector of domestic 
firms (in Th. CZK) 
 
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
Source: author’s calculation based on companies annual reports 
 
The results presented in Table 3 show that geographic proximity and agglomeration of 
FDI have a significant effect on the productivity of domestic firms in the glass sector. 
The logarithm of the number of employees in foreign firms has a significant negative 
effect at 5% level on the productivity of domestic firms in the region. Domestic firms 
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Capital intensity  -19.318 
(59.325)    26.688 
(62.539)   
Machine-made production (percent)    0.696 
(3.032)    0.372 
(3.032) 
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Time dummies  NO  NO  YES  YES 
R-Square (within)  0.477  0.476  0.499  0.496 
Sample size  135  136  135  136 
F statistic  ***  ***  ***  ***   13 
that are close to FDI have a lower productivity than domestic firms that are more far 
away from them, as expressed from the positive coefficient of the variable that 
measures the distance in kilometers from the closest FDI, significant at 10% level. 
The signs of these two variables are coherent with the existence of negative horizontal 
spillovers from FDIs on the productivity of domestic firms and with the view that a 
crowding out effect and negative consequences of competition prevail, instead of the 
potential benefits from being close to FDIs. 
Looking at firms’ characteristics that could affect firm’s performance, only the firm’s 
age has a significant positive effect. The long tradition of the glass manufacturing in 
the Czech Republic explains why a learning-by-doing effect dominates and why 
younger firms might be disadvantaged compared to older ones. Firm size, expressed 
by the natural logarithm of the number of employees, and capital-intensity or the 
percentage of machine-made production, do not have a significant effect on the 
productivity of Czech glassworks. The number of years from privatization is also not 
significant, coherently with the most recent empirical studies about privatization, that 
found low or no effects of privatization on firm’s performance (Hanousek et al. 2007). 
Adding time dummies or using a different specification for capital intensity does not 
modify the results of the variables significantly.   14 
Table 4: Results of fixed effect regressions  
Dependent variable: Productivity in the Czech privatized glass sector of domestic 
firms (in Th. CZK) 
 
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: author’s calculation based on companies annual reports 
 
In Table 4 I have added a variable that indicates the density of domestic firms at the 
regional level. I  have included this variable among the variables that indicate a 
competition effect. The literature has shown that the effect of proximity in industrial 
clusters can be both positive and negative. In some cases a concentration of firms in 
the same sector and area can bring to several positive externalities, as knowledge 
spillovers and reduction of fixed costs. However, product innovation can be limited, 
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Capital intensity  -13.207 
(58.689)    26.977 
(62.053)   
Machine-made production (percent)    1.791 
(3.211)    2.544 
( 3.209) 
Competition effect         
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Time dummies  NO  NO  YES  YES 
R-Square (within)  0.495  0.497  0.512  0.515 
Sample size  135  135  135  136 
F statistic  ***  ***  ***  ***   15 
because for creating new products new ideas and diverse firms are essentials (Callois 
2008). 
When I include the variable of density of domestic firms in the region, the coefficient 
of the variable that indicates the distance in kilometres from the closest FDI becomes 
not significant. The effect of domestic density in the region is stronger than the effect 
of the geographical distance from the closest FDI. A higher domestic density in the 
region has a negative effect on the productivity of domestic firms. This might mean 
that domestic firms in the glass sector do not help each other with exchange of 
knowledge spillovers, but that a congestion of firms in the same region reduces the 
profit and performance of the whole sector, stealing potential clients and market 
shares from each other.   
The domestic density in the region and the distance in kilometres from the closest FDI 
both have a negative effect on domestic firm’s productivity. These two variables are 
related because they are both a consequence of the privatization process and of the 
geographical choice of investment of FDIs. Therefore, I can use both as indicators of 
geographical spillovers, even if the density of domestic firms is also an indicator of 
competition between domestic companies and it is included therefore in this part of 
variables. 
Then, I have run the same eight models presented in Tables 3 and 4 adding the 
variables that concern the border effect and using the random effect model. Since the 
aim of these models is only to check the significance of these variables, all the 
coefficients will not be presented here. The results of this  analysis show that the 
variable  that indicates the distance in km from the closest national border is 
significant with a positive sign in all models at least at a 10% significance level. The 
dummies for the closest neighbor country, added in each model separately, are not 
significant. 
The significance of the distance in km from the closest national border indicates the 
existence of advantages for glassworks located along the national border and the 
existence of positive spillovers from the foreign country to these firms.  
Finally, for a sensitivity analysis, I have run all the models taking into account the 
minimum distance from the FDI that belongs to the same subsector of the glasswork 
(hand-made or automatic). Since some firms have both hand-made and automatic 
production, I have separated these firms according to the majority of production. The 
results of this analysis, not shown here (but available on request), support the 
significance of  geographical proximity at  a  5% significance level, and the 
significance of the distance by FDIs in some models at a 10% significance level.  
If I compare my results with the evidence in other transition countries, this study 
contrasts the results from Halpern and Muraközy (2007) which found a positive effect 
of distance from FDI on horizontal spillovers in Hungary. Being closer to  a FDI 
located in the Czech Republic has a negative effect on the productivity of domestic 
firms.    Only domestic firms that are near the national borders benefit from their 
geographical location  and this could be explained by the presence of vertical 
spillovers (relationships with buyers and sellers). The results of this study depend on 
the chosen industrial sector and cannot be generalized to other sectors. However, 
these results  align with the p revious empirical evidence that has found negative 
horizontal spillovers in transition countries and supports the view that FDI do not 
always have the expected positive effects on domestic firms.  
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5. Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the effects of geographical proximity and agglomeration of FDIs 
on domestic firms in the privatized glass sector in the Czech Republic. 
I have investigated whether the geographical proximity to FDIs and the agglomeration 
of foreign investors have a positive effect on the productivity of domestic firms using 
a data set from 42 privatized firms in the glass sector. I have also analyzed if domestic 
firms benefit from being located close to the national borders and could receive 
spillovers from foreign firms.  Even if these types of spillovers are not the aim of this 
paper that focuses on spillovers from FDI in the Czech Republic in the same sector, 
this secondary analysis suggests the existence of different types of geographic 
spillovers and a possible future research path with different data. 
I have presented different regression models that show that the agglomeration of 
foreign investors has a significant but negative effect on the productivity of domestic 
firms, at a 5% significance level. The geographical proximity to FDIs has a negative 
and significant effect on the productivity of domestic firms at a 10% significance 
level when the density of domestic firms at the regional level is not taken into account 
(models 1-4). When the density of domestic firms at the regional level is included in 
the model (models 5-8), the geographical proximity to FDIs has a negative but not 
significant effect on the productivity of domestic firms. 
The significance of the distance in km from the closest national border indicates the 
existence of advantages for glassworks located along the national border and the 
existence of positive spillovers from the foreign country to these firms at  a  10% 
significance level. 
The results of the econometrical analysis give strong evidence that in the glass sector 
the spatial distribution of domestic and foreign firms following the privatization has 
not been beneficial to domestic firms. The explanation may be that FDI have chosen 
the best firms, but can be due also to congestion effects of domestic firms in some 
regions. This study does not find the positive effects of agglomeration and 
geographical proximity to FDI in the Czech Republic as the  knowledge spillovers 
that the literature suggests.  Only t he location of glassworks close to the national 
borders has a positive effect on the productivity of domestic firms at  a  10% 
significance level. Foreign investors in the Czech Republic do not have positive 
spillovers on domestic firms but domestic firms receive positive effects from being 
located close to the national borders. This suggests that foreign investors in the Czech 
Republic in the glass sector could steal a market share from domestic firms, while 
foreign firms along the borders could transfer their knowledge to the Czech firms 
located close to them. The positive spillover effect could be due to vertical 
relationships (with customers and buyers) but cannot be analyzed in this study 
because of limitations in the data.  
Following the above discussion and taking into account the results of models 1-8 for 
horizontal spillovers, the results partly support the hypothesis 1 and strongly support 
hypothesis 2. 
The evidence of this paper aligns with the previous empirical studies about spillovers 
that have found mostly negative or insignificant horizontal spillovers. The results 
about border effects represent a possible future research path. 
The choice of an industrial sector hinders the generalization of these results to other 
sectors. However, I believe that this study points out the relevance of the mechanism 
of spillovers and the need of further research about this topic in other industrial 
sectors in transition countries. 
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